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THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE:

SHARING THE BURDEN OF DEFENSE

ROBERT F. REED

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THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE:

SHARING THE BURDEN OF DEFENSE



by

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FOREWORD

Only of late has defense "burden sharing" emerged as a key issue in US-Japanese relations; this increasingly important matter is the focus of this National Security Affairs monograph.

The author
Captain Robert Reed, a US Navy lawyer, examines the legal, political, economic, and attitudinal constraints inhibiting the Japanese from contributing more to their own or regional defense. Although these constraints have not prevented Japan from meeting its treaty obligations, they are factors if Japan is to assume a larger share in its defense. Captain Reed points to areas wherein Japan could well contribute without raising the specter of a resurgent Japanese militarism.

There are reassuring signs that Japan may well support a fuller partnership in the US-Japan security alliance. The National Defense University is pleased to offer this examination of that nation's stake in international stability as well as its expanding responsibilities as a major power of the Western bloc.



Richard D. Lawrence
Lieutenant General, US Army
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1. THE ALLIANCE: SHARING THE BURDEN OF DEFENSE

No issue in the US-Japanese security relationship generates more debate than that of sharing the cost of the mutual defense burden. The United States, struggling with economic problems at home and working to meet its global commitments with resources stretched to a near-breaking point, has been openly and forcefully urging Japan to increase both its defense spending and its military capabilities in order to assume more responsibility for its own defense and the regional security of Asia. Recent destabilizing events in the Persian Gulf and the growing Soviet military presence in the Pacific have increased attention to Japan's contribution to the alliance.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have succinctly stated the issue in *United States Military Posture for FY 1982*:

In view of the Soviet military buildup in the Pacific, the Japanese must make steady and significant improvements in their defense capabilities in order to bear an equitable share of our mutual defense burden.¹

More vocal advocates of a greater defense contribution by Japan accuse the Japanese of taking a "free ride" on defense by way of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty while building up economic power at home through a policy of ever-expanding exports.

Much of the criticism of Japan's defense policies is directly linked to economic problems between the two nations, particularly the huge trade surplus in favor of Japan. The balance

of trade surplus for 1981 was about \$18 billion—a figure approximately 1.6 times as great as Japan's entire defense budget. The economic dimensions of the defense relationship have led to protectionist sentiment in the US Congress. For example, in a single one-week period in November 1981, members of Congress proposed the following actions:

- Senator Jesse Helms recommended that the United States review the Mutual Security Treaty with a view toward its revision.
- Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced a resolution calling on Japan to increase its defense spending to at least the current ceiling of 1 percent of gross national product (GNP).
- Congressman Stephen L. Neal proposed that Japan pay the United States the equivalent of 2 percent of Japan's gross national product as a "security tax."

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Leonard Sullivan proposed even more drastic action, stating that "Japan's failure to accept its regional security responsibilities should be sufficient reason to deny its free access to Western markets."²

This urging of Japan to assume a greater role in its own defense and the regional security of Asia is not new. As early as 1951, prior to the signing of the Treaty of Peace, John Foster Dulles, then a special adviser to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, urged Japan to begin rearmament and to establish a defense force of 350,000 men. Dulles argued that Japan's security depended on peace and stability in the Far East and that Japan should contribute to the regional defense of the entire area.³ Ever since, the issue of burden sharing has periodically been raised with varying degrees of intensity.

Japanese reluctance to yield to US pressure for increased defense spending and greater defense capability should come as no surprise to observers of the Japanese political scene since the end of World War II. Although Japan has emerged

as a major economic power with global interests, its attention has focused primarily on economic and resource needs, not on defense requirements. Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Japan had shown a preference for an omnidirectional, resource-oriented diplomacy, and had placed little or no emphasis on the military dimensions of foreign policy. For example, after President Nixon's initiatives toward China, Japan moved quickly and independently to normalize its own relations with China, granting China recognition in 1972 and signing a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978.⁴ Japan is now China's leading trading partner—trade exceeded \$9.4 billion in 1980.

Another example of an independent Japanese diplomatic initiative was the "Fukuda Doctrine" of 1977, undertaken to effect better relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Under this doctrine, Japan provided substantial development assistance to the Southeast Asian community.

Japan is also eager to maintain good relations with the Arab nations on whom it depends for over 70 percent of its oil. In 1974, Japan voted to give the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) observer status in the United Nations, and two years later allowed the PLO to open an office in Tokyo. In October 1981, Yasser Arafat was invited to visit Japan. Although the visit was billed as unofficial, it was in fact sponsored by members of the Japanese Diet, who arranged for Arafat to meet with Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign Minister Sonoda. Arafat's invitation was to be balanced by a visit from Anwar Sadat in November, at which time Japan was prepared to offer Egypt a substantial economic aid package;⁵ this plan was thwarted by Sadat's assassination. Finally, despite official repudiation of omnidirectional diplomacy, Japan continues to have trade relations with both North Korea and Vietnam.

A recent commentary prepared under the direction of Shin Kanemaru, a former Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency, notes that Japan's problem in complying with US demands for increased defense efforts is not just one of domestic political resistance and finance, but rather "a ques-

tion of not having a coherent rationale for justifying such a major expansion of effort."⁶ This commentary continues:

For years, defense has been a secondary concern in Japan. Japan's role and choice of weapons systems were made typically in response to American suggestions and recommendations rather than on the basis of a domestic analysis of need. Increasing defense efforts were made more in terms of pleasing or placating Japan's American friends than in meeting any perceived threat.⁷

Although these observations have some merit, recent indications suggest that Japan's leaders and the Japanese public are now more rationally evaluating the international situation and the threat to Japan posed by the Soviet Union. Defense issues, once assiduously avoided, are openly discussed in both the popular press and government circles. Moreover, Japanese Self-Defense Forces, initially opposed by most Japanese people, are now accepted by approximately 90 percent of the population and by all major political parties except the Japanese Communist Party. This acceptance has been bolstered by Chinese support for increased defense measures by Japan and for the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Most important, Japan's perception of an increased threat has been heightened by these recent events:

- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan;
- The deployment of Soviet troops on the Northern Territories of Etorofu, Shikotan, and Kunashiri, and the Habomai Islands;
- The deployment of the SS-20 IRBM and BACKFIRE bombers in the eastern USSR;
- The buildup of the Soviet Pacific fleet, particularly the deployment of the Soviet carrier *Minsk* to the Pacific; and

- Soviet expansionist moves in Ethiopia, Angola, and Vietnam.

Another aspect of the defense equation is Japan's perception of an erosion in US strength and a shift in the balance of power in the Pacific. This perception has caused Japan to question the US commitment to the Mutual Security Treaty and the US capacity to effectively defend Japan.

It is against this background that the most important Japanese position on burden sharing emerged. In a joint communique issued during the summit between President Reagan and Prime Minister Suzuki in May 1981, Suzuki, after referring to the "alliance" between the United States and Japan and acknowledging "the desirability of an appropriate division of roles" between the two countries, stated:

Japan, on its own initiative and in accordance with its constitution and basic defense policy, will seek to make even greater efforts for improving its defense capabilities in Japanese territories and in its surrounding air and sea space, and for further alleviating the financial burden of US forces in Japan.⁸

In a speech later at the Washington Press Club, Suzuki elaborated on this commitment, stating that as a matter of policy Japan would defend the sea space around Japan out to several hundred miles from the shoreline, and the sealanes out to 1,000 nautical miles.

The wording of this joint communique touched off a political storm in Japan, culminating in the resignation of Foreign Minister Ito. Much of the turmoil centered on the military implications of the term "alliance," rather than on Suzuki's policy statement about Japan's increased defense efforts. A study prepared by the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies has indicated that in order to meet Suzuki's commitment, the current defense program should be, at a minimum, tripled.⁹ Unfortunately, Prime Minister Suzuki's apparent concession to US de-

mands that Japan shoulder a greater portion of the mutual defense burden was sandwiched among three separate, untimely events that culminated in large-scale demonstrations in Japan and severely strained the alliance.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Suzuki's policy statement stands as an authoritative Japanese commitment to increase its defense efforts and to alleviate the financial burden of maintaining US forces in Japan.

THE LEGAL OBLIGATION

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in a report to Congress, defined burden sharing as "the fair distribution of political, manpower, materiel and economic costs of maintaining our alliance postures."¹¹ Other observers have referred to burden-sharing concepts as "equitable share," "rational division of labor," and "appropriate division of roles." These concepts defy explicit definition or accurate measurement and are certain to cause disagreements in the future concerning their exact meaning. In order to quantify Japan's contribution to the alliance, it will be useful to examine the legal obligations assumed by Japan in the formal documents creating the security arrangement, and then to look at some of the factors used to measure contribution.

Treaty of Peace and Security Treaty, 1951

The first step in creating the alliance between the United States and Japan consisted of the signing of the Treaty of Peace on 8 September 1951.¹² This treaty restored to the Japanese people full sovereignty over Japan and its territorial waters. It further recognized that Japan, as a sovereign nation, possessed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, and that Japan could enter into collective security arrangements. Japan entered into a security treaty with the United States on the same day that the Treaty of Peace was signed.¹³

During the negotiation of this security arrangement, John Foster Dulles continued to press for a Japanese commitment to rearmament in order that Japan might contribute to the regional security of the Far East. When the Japanese balked at this proposal, General MacArthur supported their position. The best Dulles could do was to work into the preamble of the security treaty a future commitment to defense. Thus, the preamble provided that as a "provisional arrangement" the United States would maintain armed forces in Japan in the expectation that "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression." This original security arrangement imposed no explicit responsibility upon the United States to come to the aid of Japan in case of attack. It did, however, give the United States the right to station troops in Japan who "may" be used to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and to the internal and external security of Japan. It further prohibited Japan from granting similar rights to a third power. The treaty was to terminate only if both parties concurred.

Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, 1954

In 1954, the United States and Japan concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the purpose of which was to establish a legal basis for the furnishing of military equipment and technology to Japan.¹⁴ In this agreement, Japan committed herself to fulfill the military obligations assumed under the security treaty and to take "all reasonable measures" required to develop her defense capacities. Shortly thereafter, in partial fulfillment of these obligations, Japan enacted the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law creating the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and their civilian control agency with a mission of defending Japan against direct and indirect aggression.

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 1960

During the latter half of the 1950s, Japanese leaders sought, through diplomatic initiatives, to revise the 1951 security treaty. These leaders wanted an explicit commitment from the United States to defend Japan from external attack, elimination of the controversial section dealing with internal security, more mutuality regarding consultations, and a fixed termination date. The United States, for its part, continued to press for a Japanese commitment to share in the defense of the western Pacific, including Guam. Japan achieved her goals in the new treaty signed on 19 January 1960, while the United States again failed to obtain a Japanese commitment to regional defense.¹⁵

What legal obligations did Japan assume under the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security?

- Japan agreed, subject to constitutional limitations, to maintain and develop its capacity to resist armed attack.
- Japan agreed to consult with the United States whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security of the Far East is threatened.
- Japan agreed to act to meet the common danger in the event of an "armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan."
- Japan agreed to provide facilities and areas for the use of US Armed Forces for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and maintaining peace and security in the Far East. Article VI of the Mutual Security Treaty provided that the use of these facilities and areas was to be governed by a separate agreement.¹⁶

On the same date that the security treaty was executed, the United States and Japan concluded two other significant agreements. The first consisted of an exchange of notes concerning implementation of article VI of the security treaty.

These notes established the requirement for prior consultation with the Government of Japan concerning "major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States Armed Forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan" other than those conducted for the direct defense of Japan.¹⁷ In effect, this requirement for prior consultation gave Japan a veto over US troop deployments, choice of weapons, and combat operations outside Japan in support of areas such as Korea.

The second agreement was the one referred to in article VI of the security treaty concerning the use of facilities and areas and the status of US Armed Forces in Japan.¹⁸ Under the terms of this agreement, Japan was to furnish, without cost to the United States, facilities and areas for the use of US forces in Japan. The United States, in turn, agreed to bear "without cost to Japan" all expenses incident to the maintenance of these forces.

As is evident from a review of the documents forming the basis of the alliance, Japan's legal obligations extend only to the provision of facilities and areas for the US Armed Forces and to the maintenance and development of Japan's capacity to resist armed attack. This latter obligation includes no time limits and lacks specificity concerning the forces required to meet the requirement. Japan is committed to act only when under direct attack itself or when US forces within Japan are attacked. There is no obligation to come to the aid of the United States if attack occurs anywhere outside Japanese territory; neither has Japan agreed to participate in any regional defense scheme, nor to share the cost of maintaining US forces deployed to Japan.

Inasmuch as the evidence indicates that Japan is meeting its legal obligations under the documents creating the alliance, appeals for greater defense burden sharing must be made on equitable grounds, based on such concepts as fairness, ability to contribute, and mutual cooperation for the common

defense. Is Japan carrying its fair share? The next section examines several methods of measuring defense contribution.

INDICATORS OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEFENSE

Traditional Indicators

Four traditional indicators used to compare defense expenditures among nations are total defense expenditures; defense expenditures per capita; defense expenditures as a percentage of the total budget; and defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product (GNP). Table 1.1 illustrates these spending indicators for the top 30 nations in defense spending. Although Japan is eighth in the world in total defense outlays, it is last among these 30 nations in percentage of defense expenditures to total budget and percentage of defense expenditures to GNP. Japan is also far down the list in defense spending per capita, behind nations such as Sweden, Australia, and Canada.

Table 1.2 compares Japan's gross national product and budget figures for selected years between 1955-1980. Although the gross national product has continuously climbed, the defense budget as a percentage of GNP has remained fairly constant since 1970 at 0.8 to 0.9 percent, while defense spending as a percentage of total budget has continuously declined. Figure 1.1 illustrates the trends of these two indicators.

Department of Defense Burden-Sharing Factors

In a report to Congress, Secretary of Defense Weinberger outlined allied commitments to defense spending.¹⁹ After first qualifying the data by stating that "some allied contributions are not readily quantifiable," particularly noting differing definitions of defense expenditures and problems with exchange rates, deflators, effects of taxation, and computation of

manpower costs, the report examines selected quantitative indicators to evaluate allied contributions. The conclusion reached in the report is that the "NATO allies, as a group, appear to be shouldering at least their fair share of the NATO and Japan defense burden."²⁰

This conclusion, however, does not answer the question of whether, after excluding the NATO contribution, Japan is shouldering its fair share of the defense burden. Analysis of the data contained in Weinberger's report indicates that it is not. If we compare the four selected indicators of ability to contribute with seven selected indicators of contribution that Weinberger noted, Japan registered at or near the bottom of all comparative categories.

Hence, on both traditional and Department of Defense measurement scales, Japan's contribution to defense burden sharing is at or near the bottom of the list. Although Japan may not be getting a "free ride" on defense, the evidence indicates that Japan is not contributing its fair share.

The remainder of this study analyzes the domestic constraints inhibiting or preventing the Japanese from truly sharing the defense burden, examines the current Japanese defense contribution, discusses the cost of maintaining US forces in Japan, suggests some ways to reduce the US burden, and recommends an approach for persuading the Japanese to bear a larger portion of the mutual defense burden.

TABLE 1.1
Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

Country	Total Defense Expenditure (in millions of dollars)	Defense Expenditure per Capita	Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of Total Budget	Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of GNP
Soviet Union	\$148,000**	\$ 574**	Unconfirmed	11-13
United States	142,700	644	23.3*	5.2
China	56,941	56	18.0	9.0
West Germany	25,120	410	22.2	3.3
Britain	24,448	437	10.7	4.9
Saudi Arabia	20,704	2,518	28.1	15.0
France	20,220	374	17.5*	3.9
Japan	8,960	75	5.2	0.9
Italy	6,590	124*	8.2*	2.4
Netherlands	5,238	374	7.3	3.4
Israel	5,200	1,353	32.0	31.1
Spain	4,819*	129	13.2**	2.9
East Germany	4,790	285	7.5	6.3
Poland	4,670	131	6.0	2.4
India	4,408	7	26.9*	3.9
Canada	4,240	177	8.6*	1.7
Iran	4,200	110	12.3	10.9***
Syria	4,040	459	54.9	22.1
Australia	3,900	272	9.7	2.8
Belgium	3,785	378	9.2*	3.3
Yugoslavia	3,634	164	56.9	5.2***
Sweden	3,568	432	7.7	3.3
Czechoslovakia	3,520	229	7.6	2.8
South Korea	3,460	91	36.0	5.5
Turkey	2,591*	59*	15.6*	4.5**
South Africa	2,556	89	16.1*	3.9
Iraq	2,328	183*	30.1*	10.9
Egypt	2,168*	54*	Unconfirmed	13.2
Brazil	2,068*	18*	8.9*	1.0**
Indonesia	2,070*	14	12.3	3.4

Sources: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1981


Note: All figures are for fiscal year 1980, except those marked * (FY 1979), ** (FY 1978), or *** (FY 1977).

Table 1.2
Japanese Defense Expenditures, 1955-1981

Year (FY)	GNP (in billions of yen)	Total Budget (in billions of yen)	Growth From Previous Year (Percent)	Defense Budget (in billions of yen)	Growth from Previous Year	Defense Budget as a Percentage of GNP	Defense Budget as a Percentage of Total Budget
1955	7,559	991.5	-0.8	134.9	-3.3	1.78	13.61
1960	12,748	1,569.7	10.6	156.9	0.6	1.23	9.99
1965	28,160	3,656.1	12.4	301.4	9.6	1.07	8.24
1970	72,440	7,949.8	17.9	569.5	17.7	0.79	7.16
1971	84,320	9,414.3	16.4	670.9	17.8	0.80	7.13
1972	90,550	11,467.7	21.8	800.2	19.3	0.88	6.98
1973	109,800	14,284.1	24.6	935.5	16.9	0.85	6.55
1974	131,500	17,099.4	19.7	1,093.0	16.8	0.83	6.39
1975	158,500	21,288.8	24.5	1,327.3	21.4	0.84	6.23
1976	168,100	24,296.0	14.1	1,512.4	13.9	0.90	6.22
1977	192,850	28,514.3	17.4	1,690.6	11.8	0.88	5.93
1978	210,800	34,295.0	20.3	1,901.0	12.4	0.90	5.54
1979	232,000	38,600.1	12.6	2,094.5	10.2	0.90	5.43
1980	247,800	42,568.6	10.3	2,230.2	6.5	0.90	5.24
1981	264,800	46,788.1	9.9	2,400.0	7.6	0.91	5.13

Source: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1981.

FIGURE 1.1. Trends in Japanese Defense Spending



SOURCE: Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1981*.

2. THE DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS

Since the end of World War II, a number of constitutional and other legal restraints have dramatically shaped Japan's evolving security policy. Policy decisions superimposed on this legal framework have further constrained the development of Japan's military capabilities. In addition, certain characteristics of the Japanese political system serve to constrain development of the military instrument as an effective tool in Japan's overall security policy. These constraints are often raised as impediments to various burden-sharing proposals.

LEGAL CONSTRAINTS

Japan's Constitution

The most important domestic legal constraint is article IX of the Japanese Constitution, which provides:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.¹

This "war renunciation" clause of the Japanese Constitution has been the subject of intense debate since its inception

in 1947. Even today, its full ramifications are not clearly defined. One writer has correctly noted, however, that article IX "has been and is likely to remain a most formidable factor, shaping the directions of Japan's security policy in general and constraining the development of military capabilities in particular."²

What are the origins of this controversial article of the Japanese Constitution? And how, in view of its plain language, has Japan been able to build air, land, and sea forces consisting of approximately 243,000 men outfitted with modern weapons and equipment? And what restrictions does this constitutional limitation place on Japan's ability to share the defense burden?

Responsibility for this particular article of the Japanese constitution is attributed to General Douglas MacArthur, who envisaged Japan as the new Switzerland of the Pacific; yet MacArthur was also one of the first to recognize the shortcomings of this article. After the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula, he ordered the Japanese to form a Police Reserve Force of 75,000 men to replace American troops that had been diverted to Korea. Subsequently, in an address to the Japanese people on 1 January 1951, he recognized that the ideal of renunciation of war "must give way to the overwhelming law of self-preservation" and that Japan, in concert with its allies, must "mount force to repel force."³ The forming of this Police Reserve Force, which later became the nucleus of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, marked the beginning of Japan's rearmament; it also marked the beginning of the controversy over interpretation of article IX.

The central issue was whether the constitutional limitations imposed by article IX denied Japan the inherent right of self-defense, which in the absence of the constitutional provision it would possess under international law as a sovereign nation. Japanese leaders interpreted article IX to mean that the constitution prohibited wars of self-defense as well as wars of aggression. Prime Minister Yoshida, for example, maintained that the possession of war potential even for self-

defense required constitutional revision.⁴ This restrictive interpretation directly conflicted with the obligations Japan undertook in the 1951 security treaty to "increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression." In fact, the political opposition at the time opposed the security treaty on the ground that the obligations imposed on Japan were unconstitutional.

Early attempts to amend article IX failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority of the Diet. Failing constitutional amendment, a more liberal interpretation was required to justify the Police Reserve Force and its eventual successor, the Self-Defense Forces. Accordingly, the government focused on the term *war potential*, asserting that this meant the capability to effectively execute a modern war. This definition was later expanded to include the proposition that a capability which was something less than war potential, used solely for self-defense, was constitutionally permissible. Finally, the Hatoyama government took the position that article IX did not prohibit the "minimum necessary war potential for self-defense."⁵ The implication of this interpretation is that the constitution does permit Japan to engage in a war of self-defense.

This latter position on self-defense was supported by the Japanese Supreme Court in its 1959 decision in the Sunakawa case.⁶ This case, which is the only Supreme Court decision dealing directly with interpretation of article IX, arose from an incident in mid-1957 at Tachikawa Air Base, a US facility located approximately twenty miles west of Tokyo. Local citizens opposed a US-Japanese agreement to extend the runway at the air base. The Japanese Government was responsible for surveying the additional land required and obtaining it from its owners. When Japanese surveyors arrived to conduct the survey, local residents objected and a riot ensued. Rioters who trespassed on the US base were arrested by Japanese police and charged with illegal entry.

Seven accused persons were tried in the Tokyo District Court and found not guilty, on the ground that the Special

Criminal Law under which they had been charged had been illegally enacted in implementation of the US-Japan security treaty, which treaty "was unconstitutional because it provided for the stationing of United States forces in Japan."⁷ The court determined that these forces constituted war potential, the maintenance of which was prohibited by article IX of the Japanese Constitution.

In view of the far-reaching legal ramifications of this decision, the Tokyo public prosecutor appealed the case directly to the Japanese Supreme Court. In reversing the Tokyo District Court, the Supreme Court noted that article IX renounces war and "prohibits the maintenance of what is termed war potential." Continuing, it noted:

Naturally, the above in no way denies the inherent right of self-defense, which our country possesses as a sovereign nation, and the pacifism of our Constitution has never provided for either defenselessness or nonresistance.... If there are to be guarantees of the security of our country in order to preserve its peace and security, it is natural that we be able to select ... appropriate measures and methods regarded as suitable under existing international conditions. Article IX of the Constitution in no way prohibits a request to another country for security guarantees for the maintenance of peace and safety of our country.⁸

The Supreme Court further stated that the war potential prohibited by the constitution was that over which Japan has the power to exercise command and control; the prohibition did not apply to the war potential of foreign military forces stationed in Japan. The court concluded that the district court judgment departed from the "proper sphere ... of judicial review" and erred in its interpretation of the constitution.

The Supreme Court limited its decision to the constitutionality of the security treaty and the presence of US forces and bases in Japan. It did not decide the equally important issue of the constitutionality of the Japanese Self-Defense

Forces (SDF) or of Japan's maintenance of war potential for self-defense. In fact, no Japanese court has yet had occasion to rule specifically on the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces. How, then, are these forces justified? The government, seizing on the Supreme Court's language concerning the inherent right of self-defense, determined that there is no constitutional prohibition on "the maintenance of minimum military strength necessary" to exercise this right of self-defense.⁹ Recognizing that there are limits to the defense capability permissible under the constitution, the government has indicated that it will remain flexible on this issue, declaring that any constitutional limitation "has to be judged in accordance with the prevailing international situation, the standards of military technology, and other conditions."¹⁰

The Japanese Government, however, has enunciated certain constitutional limitations:

No offensive weapons. Although the distinction between a strictly defensive weapon and an offensive weapon is difficult at best, the Japanese Government has delineated some weapons that Japan may not possess, including ICBMs, IRBMs, attack aircraft carriers, long-range bombers, and other powerful weapons useful only for aggression or destruction of foreign lands. Nuclear weapons per se are not constitutionally banned—only those defined as strategic or offensive. Tactical or defensive nuclear weapons are constitutionally permissible, but they face other legal and policy restrictions. Japanese perceptions of what constitutes an offensive weapon, however, are not static; for example, jet aircraft, once considered to be offensive, are now accepted as defensive weapons.

No overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces. The Japanese Government has consistently maintained that the overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces is unconstitutional. This prohibition was first confirmed in a 1954 Diet resolution, but limited exceptions have been made, in that defense attaches are attached to foreign embassies, SDF personnel train in the United States, and Japanese warships call in foreign ports. Recently the Japanese Government modified

this prohibition to forbid only the dispatch "of armed troops to a foreign country for the purpose of using armed force."¹¹

The issue of overseas deployments is closely related to the constitutional issue of the limits of self-defense. The Japanese Government has long been on record as asserting that Japan's right of self-defense can only be invoked after an attack on Japanese territory, and that an attack by Japan on enemy bases could only be undertaken in the limited circumstance where the destruction of Japan was certain and no alternative means of defense was available. This interpretation rules out a preemptive strike on enemy territory.

No collective security arrangements. Despite the security arrangement between the United States and Japan, the Japanese Government has taken the position that "Japan is constitutionally banned from exercising the right of collective self-defense." The rationale given in the Japan Defense Agency's 1980 White Paper on the Defense of Japan is that,

The constitution allows an act of self-defense as far as it is intended to defend Japan's own land and people, but does not permit Japan to cope with aggression against the land and people of a foreign nation with which Japan has close relations.¹²

The Japanese Government justifies the US-Japan Security Treaty on the ground that the treaty has no requirement for Japan to come to the defense of the United States or its forces except in response to attacks within "the territories under the administration of Japan."¹³

It is clear, therefore, that the constitutional prohibition against collective self-defense would prevent Japan from joining such alliances as NATO or ANZUS. Less clear, however, is whether this prohibition prevents Japan from participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Japanese officials have differed on this issue. In 1961, Prime Minister Ikeda indicated that the participation of Japan's Self-Defense Forces in a UN action that had no military objective and involved no combat operations might be constitution-

ally permissible. Other Japanese leaders have expressed similar views, emphasizing that the objective of the UN force was the determining factor: Japan's involvement in a UN action that contemplated the exercise of military power or had the objective of engaging in armed action would be unconstitutional, whereas Japan's participation in supervisory or observatory UN actions might be constitutional. The constitutional issue notwithstanding, the Japanese Government has declared as a matter of policy that it will not participate in UN security actions of any type.¹⁴

No conscription. The Japanese Constitution does not provide for draft registration or conscription, but article XVIII, which prohibits involuntary servitude, has been interpreted as prohibiting compulsory military service.

The problems of building a credible defense capability while some segments of the population still challenge the legitimacy of the Self-Defense Forces and while such strict constitutional restraints exist have been enormous. Seiichi Onishi, former head of Japan's Defense Academy, has succinctly stated the problem:

Japan's defense strength has had to be built up not under any express stipulations of the Constitution but on the theory of a national right of self-defense considered to transcend the Constitution. Arguments over the nation's defense strength have been made not from the strategic viewpoint of whether or not it meets Japan's security requirements in the current international environment but from the legal view of how the national right of self-defense should be defined.¹⁵

Other Domestic Laws

The Japanese Constitution is not the only legal barrier affecting the burden-sharing issue. Other domestic legislation also reinforces the constitutional constraints or establishes

new obstacles; for example, the Self-Defense Forces Law and the Defense Agency Establishment Law regulate functions such as command and control, force size and structure, permissible deployments, and rules of engagement.

The restrictiveness of these domestic regulations is illustrated by the cumbersome mechanism through which civilian control is exercised over the Self-Defense Forces. The Prime Minister exercises "the supreme right of direction and supervision over the Self-Defense Forces" through the Director-General of the Defense Agency.¹⁶ Before the Prime Minister can order a deployment, even in an emergency, however, he must obtain the approval of the National Defense Council, the Cabinet, and, usually, the Diet. In 1978, General Kurisu, then the Chairman of the Japanese Joint Staff Council, pointed out that because of these cumbersome procedures, front-line commanders might have to take "supralegal action" and engage in battle solely on their own responsibility to prevent violations of the country's territory. As a result of this statement, Kurisu was forced to resign for challenging the principle of civilian control.¹⁷

The Japanese Atomic Energy Basic Law and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which Japan ratified in 1976, restrict the deployment of nuclear weapons of all types. The former would also prohibit the building of nuclear submarines, inasmuch as it provides that "the research, development, and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes."

Status of Forces Agreement

Another legal obstacle to increased burden sharing on the part of Japan is the present allocation of costs contained in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Article XXIV of the SOFA provides as follows:

1. It is agreed that the United States will bear for the duration of this Agreement without cost to Japan all expenditures incident to the maintenance of

the United States Armed Forces in Japan except those to be borne by Japan as provided in paragraph 2.

2. It is agreed that Japan will furnish for the duration of this Agreement without cost to the United States and make compensation where appropriate to the owners and suppliers thereof all facilities and areas and rights of way, including facilities and areas jointly used.

Although this article does not prohibit Japan from making contributions toward the payment of expenses related to the maintenance of US forces, it is clear that Japan has assumed no obligation to share these costs. Japan has used this section of the SOFA in the past to avoid sharing certain maintenance costs, including the cost of Japanese labor employed by US forces.

Despite the cost allocations of this article, however, Japan has in the past few years assumed some of the labor expenses of Japanese workers employed by the United States, particularly welfare expenses and portions of salaries that exceed the standards for national public service personnel. It can be expected that increased US pressure on Japan to assume more of these maintenance expenses will be challenged by the political opposition there, on the ground that the United States is trying to amend unilaterally the cost-allocation provisions of the SOFA. Japanese assumption of a portion of the labor costs, however, indicates that the Japanese Government may be willing to negotiate on this issue. By taking a flexible position on what constitutes "expenditures incident to the maintenance" of US forces, Japan could eventually fund all maintenance and labor costs except actual salaries of US military and civilian employees and certain operational expenses, without requiring an amendment to the SOFA.

POLICY CONSTRAINTS

Limitation of Defense Budget to 1 Percent of GNP

One of the most significant policy decisions acting to constrain the growth of Japan's defense capabilities was made at a meeting of the Miki Cabinet in November 1976, when it was decided that,

Each fiscal year's defense-related expenditures, required for the buildup of defense capability, will be limited to not more than one percent of the estimated gross national product of each fiscal year for the time being.¹⁸

The government noted that the term "for the time being" did not refer to any fixed period, leaving open the possibility that the 1 percent limitation would be reexamined as necessary. John Endicott, in a commentary entitled "The Defense Policy of Japan," explains why this limitation was acceptable to diverse Japanese factions: to groups seeking greater defense expenditures, Japan's expanding GNP promised more money, in real terms, for defense; to groups opposing greater defense spending, the 1 percent limitation imposed a ceiling that promised to alleviate concern over plans for massive and rapid rearmament.¹⁹

Since its pronouncement, this 1 percent limitation has become a psychological barrier to comprehensive defense planning. The press, the public, and the opposition parties analyze and measure each new plan or proposal to determine its effect on the 1 percent budgetary restriction—proposals viewed as requiring substantial increases in defense spending encounter strong opposition.

How long will this policy remain in effect? Several factors indicate that the limitation will continue for at least several more years. First, the Japanese Government is experiencing huge budget deficits and a mounting public debt. Although most of the debt is in the area of public works and social welfare, increased defense spending in the face of budgetary deficits would meet resistance within the bureaucracy and certain factions of the Liberal Democratic Party, as well as from opposition parties. In addition the general population would be reluctant to accept markedly higher defense expenditures if these expenditures resulted in tax increases. Polls indicate that most Japanese believe that Japan's defense spending is sufficient or greater than it should be. Finally, statements by government officials indicate that the 1 percent limitation will be in effect at least for the next several years. In November 1980, Prime Minister Suzuki declared that his Cabinet would maintain the policy of limiting defense expenditures within 1 percent of GNP, although he would not predict what might happen 5 or 10 years hence. In October 1981, the Director-General of Japan's Defense Agency stated that the issue of whether the defense budget would exceed the 1 percent level depended on "how much economic indicators grow in the coming years." And the Nakasone government has announced that the FY 1983 defense budget will be \$11.48 billion, less than 1 percent of the estimated GNP.

This budgetary constraint will continue to have a serious effect on burden sharing. Most analysts agree that Japan must increase defense expenditures significantly above the 1 percent ceiling if it is serious about honoring Prime Minister Suzuki's pledge to defend the searanes out to 1,000 miles and to relieve the financial burden of US forces in Japan. Once this barrier is broken, however, and assuming no new ceiling is placed on defense spending, it is conceivable that defense expenditures could eventually increase substantially above the 1 percent level.

Three Nonnuclear Principles

As was indicated earlier, nuclear weapons per se are not prohibited by the Japanese Constitution; only those weapons considered to be "offensive" are constitutionally proscribed. The theoretical legality of Japan's possession of defensive/tactical nuclear weapons was first noted by Prime Minister Kishi in 1957, and was reaffirmed in the Japan Defense Agency's 1970 White Paper on Defense:

It would be possible to say that in a legal and theoretical sense, possession of small nuclear weapons, falling within the minimum requirement for capacity necessary for self-defense and not posing a threat of aggression to other countries, would be permissible.

Despite the theoretical legality of such weapons, however, Japan has adopted the so-called Three Nonnuclear Principles—not to produce nuclear weapons, not to acquire them, and not to permit their introduction into Japan. Although Prime Minister Kishi was the first to state as a matter of policy that Japan would not possess nuclear weapons, it was Prime Minister Sato who announced the Three Nonnuclear Principles as government policy at a 1968 meeting of the Diet. Subsequently, in 1971, these principles were incorporated in a Diet resolution, and they have been reaffirmed by every succeeding government.

Two recent events demonstrated that the Three Nonnuclear Principles still reflect official policy. First, after former US Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer made statements in May 1981, to the effect that US warships armed with nuclear weapons had been calling at Japanese ports since 1960 with the understanding of the Japanese Government, Prime Minister Suzuki reaffirmed the Three Nonnuclear Principles and denied that any nuclear weapons had been introduced into Japan. The basis for Suzuki's refutation was that in order for US warships armed with nuclear weapons to enter Japanese ports, there must be prior consultations in accordance

with the 1960 exchange of notes—and since the United States had never requested prior consultation on this issue, no nuclear weapons had been brought in. Suzuki also steadfastly refused to ask the United States whether any of its ships entering Japanese ports carry such weapons. US policy on nuclear weapons has been neither to confirm nor to deny their presence in any location.

This convenient arrangement of mutual avoidance of the issue was reported in the Japanese press as being based on differing interpretations of the principle concerning the "introduction" of nuclear weapons. The Japanese word for this principle is *mochikome*, which literally translated means "to bring in." The United States, according to the Japanese press, defines introduction as the placing of nuclear weapons on shore. Thus, under the US interpretation, nuclear weapons carried aboard ships calling in Japanese ports would not fall within this prohibition. Contrary to the press reports, Reischauer implies that there was no misunderstanding between the two governments on this issue, and that the cause of the problem was that

The Japanese government had been too timid to explain the validity of the American interpretation that the ban on the "introduction" of nuclear weapons did not apply to American warships passing through Japanese waters, resorting instead to evasive statements about its complete confidence that the United States would live up to its agreements.²⁰

The second reaffirmation of the Three Nonnuclear Principles came in response to a statement allegedly made on 10 November 1981 by Eugene Rostow, then the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to the effect that the United States might deploy cruise missiles and other theater nuclear weapons to Japan, if necessary.²¹ Both Prime Minister Suzuki and Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa reacted sharply, stressing that Japan would adhere to its Three Nonnuclear Principles and refuse to accept such weapons.

Given Japan's "allergy" to nuclear weapons in general, its ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1976, its enactment of a domestic Atomic Energy Law limiting the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and its continued adherence to the Three Nonnuclear Principles, it is evident that Japan has decided to reject all types of nuclear weapons on its soil. Any retreat from this position would most likely be limited to official recognition that the principle concerning introduction of nuclear weapons does not apply to US warships transiting Japanese territorial waters or entering Japanese ports. This concession would merely amount to recognition of what is probably an existing reality and would be consistent with Japan's continuing reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.

What is most significant about the Reischauer statements is the relatively mild reaction of the Japanese public. Polls conducted by the Japanese press show that although a majority of the persons polled support the Three Nonnuclear Principles, approximately 45 percent are not opposed to permitting nuclear-armed warships to make port calls in Japan and to pass through Japanese territorial waters. Moreover, 70 to 80 percent of those polled doubt the Japanese Government's claim that the principle concerning introduction has been strictly observed.²² These poll results reflect the increased sophistication of the Japanese public and the continued public support for the US-Japan security arrangement.

Policy Against Weapons Export

Another policy that at least peripherally impinges on the burden-sharing issue is the Japanese Government's policy, adopted in 1967, establishing a ban on the export of weapons to Communist bloc countries, to countries to which arms exports are banned by a UN resolution, and to countries currently involved in an international dispute or likely to become involved in a dispute. This policy has, in effect, banned the export of weapons to all nations, including the United States.

These export restrictions have been unpopular with Japan's defense contractors, who would like to use their production capacity fully. In 1976, these contractors exerted intense pressure on the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to revise the restrictive no-export policy. Instead of gaining concessions, however, they received a setback when Prime Minister Miki issued new, more restrictive guidelines that not only continued the ban on the export of weapons but also expanded the restriction to include the export of facilities for the manufacture of weapons.²³

The weapons export ban significantly affects two related issues—defense research and development (R&D) and technology transfer. Under current restrictions, the only potential customer for the products of Japan's defense industry is the Japan Defense Agency. Given this limited consumer demand, the unit cost of each production item is significantly higher than would be the case in an expanded export market. Defense contractors are therefore reluctant to invest heavily in research and development when there is such limited potential for a reasonable return on their investment. This limited potential in turn diminishes the likelihood of the development of new and innovative weapons and weapons systems.

Closely related to the R&D issue is the issue of technology transfer. The United States has provided almost all of Japan's postwar defense technology, much of it through the licensing of weapons and weapons systems such as the Hawk missile and P-3C and F-15 aircraft. As a result of the increased technical expertise of Japanese industry, however, the United States has been pressing for a two-way technological exchange. The Department of Defense would like to engage in joint ventures with Japan to develop defense projects, including weapons systems. Some of these projects would seek innovative technical developments in areas such as paint chemistry, computers, lasers, fiber optics, robotics, and other electronics.

Officials of the Foreign Ministry, MITI, and the Defense Agency are now working to develop a coordinated view on

technology transfer. The transfer of technology or the joint development of weapons or weapons systems is considered to fall within the arms export restriction, but the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency favor technological exchange as "an exceptional case to the policy."²⁴ MITI has been more cautious about making such an exception. A consensus on this issue is expected soon, and a decision favorable to the United States could be a significant burden-sharing measure. The risk to the United States in such a policy change is that Japan may eventually become a competitor in the world's arms market.

POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

In addition to legal and policy constraints, certain characteristics of the Japanese political system tend to restrict the way in which decisions on defense policy are made and implemented. The intricacies of Japanese decisionmaking are beyond the scope of this monograph, but this section does discuss in broad terms three important interrelated elements that influence Japan's policymaking: the requirement for consensus, party factionalism, and the limited power of the Prime Minister to independently implement policy.

Requirement for Consensus

One of the most important aspects of the Japanese decisionmaking process is the requirement for consensus. Under the Japanese concept of consensus, the aim is to bring as many decisionmakers as possible into agreement on any particular issue. The Japan Defense Agency's 1970 white paper on the Defense of Japan proclaims that "a national consensus is the very basis of defense." How is this consensus obtained? And why is it important in the decisionmaking process?

Consensus building is a multilevel process. In industry, it usually begins with lower- or middle-level management within

a unit or division. In the case of the government, consensus building begins, for the bureaucracy, within the bureaus or divisions; in the Diet, it usually begins at the research council level among individual Diet members. After consensus is reached at this level, proposals are forwarded to the next level, where they go through the same process before again being forwarded upward. This process, called *ringisei*, is a sort of collegial action, permitting all members to have an input and, more important, providing an opportunity for each member to modify his views during the process without losing face. The objective is to reach a decision on which there is broad unanimity, producing an outcome that assimilates minority perspectives to the greatest extent possible. The system is designed to avoid conflict and direct confrontation in both intragroup and intergroup settings; often the form of the process is as important as the substance. Ideally, the final outcome of this decisionmaking process is a policy that has the support of most elements of society.²⁵

Typically, a defense-related issue goes through the following process: A proposal is considered at the research council level of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); research is conducted and information gathered on all facets of the issue. Officials of concerned government ministries are invited to give testimony or provide information. Simultaneously, if the issue is one that will affect the defense industry, an appropriate group within the business community, such as the Defense Committee of the Keidanran,* will also take up the issue. When the research council reaches consensus, the proposal is forwarded to the LDP Policy Board for approval and then to the LDP Executive Committee for its endorsement. Finally, the proposal is sent to the Cabinet for its concurrence, following which the proposal is introduced in the Diet as a government-sponsored bill. Since our hypothetical issue concerns defense, it must also be considered by the National Defense Council. Throughout this process, inputs will be received from interested commissions and advisory boards.²⁶

*The Federation of Economic Organizations

As might be expected, the process of obtaining consensus on an important issue is complex and time-consuming. A simple majority is not enough—unanimity is the goal, but at least an 80 percent agreement is usually required. Normally, when consensus cannot be reached on a particular issue, the matter will be shelved temporarily. For example, it took six years of work to obtain a sufficient consensus to ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1976. Attempts to push unpopular decisions without first gaining the required consensus can have unpleasant results, such as the widespread demonstrations that occurred after the ratification of the 1960 Security Treaty and the construction of Narita Airport outside Tokyo. Because of the time that it takes to build consensus, it is unrealistic for the United States to expect rapid policy responses to increased burden-sharing proposals—and the more radical the proposal, the longer the consensus building will take.

Party Factionalism

Japan's parliamentary form of government features a multiparty system in which one party, the Liberal Democratic Party, has been the dominant force since its inception in 1955. Although its popular support has decreased over the years, and it no longer commands a majority of the popular vote, the LDP has nonetheless been able to maintain a slim majority in both houses of the Diet. This majority position, together with the disarray of the opposition parties, has allowed the LDP to enact its programs and implement its policy decisions without significant regard for the political opposition. Table 2.1 shows the strength of each political party before and after the 1980 dual elections.

TABLE 2.1
Composition of Japanese Diet

	Upper House		Lower House	
	1979	1980	1979	1980
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	124	135	248	284
Japan Socialist Party (JSP)	52	47	107	107
Komeito	28	26	57	33
Japan Communist Party (JCP)	16	12	39	29
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)	10	12	35	32
New Liberal Club (NLC)	2	2	4	12
Shaminren	3	2	2	3
Other Groups	1	2	0	0
Independents	10	13	19	11
Vacancy	6	1	0	0
Totals	252	252	511	511

The important policy discussions in Japanese national politics are conducted within the councils of the LDP, where factions headed by powerful senior members of the LDP, many of whom hold leadership positions in the Diet or Cabinet, play a critical role. One observer has noted:

The LDP has not had to share its policymaking powers with the opposition parties, or pay much heed to their foreign-policy positions. From a practical standpoint, the difficult problem has been to ensure that all factions within the LDP continue to support the foreign policies deemed important by the party's leadership.²⁷

Reaching consensus within the LDP on controversial issues usually requires extensive intraparty negotiations, in which tradeoffs and compromises are the rule rather than the exception. Table 2.2 illustrates the current factional division of the LDP and the number of cabinet or ministerial posts held by members of each faction.

Table 2.2
Number of Liberal Democratic Party
Factions and Cabinet Positions

Faction Leader	Lower House	Upper House	Cabinet Positions
Suzuki	56	20	4
Tanaka/Nikaido	62	39	4
Fukuda	48	28	4
Nakasone	44	6	3
Komoto	33	10	3
Nakagawa	10	1	1
Nonfactional	33	31	2

The fall of the Ohira Government in May 1980 demonstrates the degree to which intraparty bickering and jockeying for leadership positions can be carried. Ohira had been out of favor with several LDP factions for failing to step down after the poor LDP showing in the October 1979 elections. He was also under attack by the opposition parties for failing to deal forcefully with government corruption. To show its displeasure with Ohira's policies, the Japan Socialist Party brought a no-confidence motion to the floor of the Diet. Normally, such a motion would fail on strictly party lines, but at the time of the vote, dissatisfied LDP factions were also pressing Ohira for reform, threatening a Diet boycott to back up their demand. While the intraparty negotiations were still underway, the Ohira group forced the beginning of the Diet session. Miki and Fukuda, both former Prime Ministers, kept 69 members of their factions away from the Diet session. As a result, the opposition passed the no-confidence resolution by a vote of 243 to 187.²⁸

Ohira, instead of stepping down, called for new elections, but before they were held he died suddenly of a heart attack. In the subsequent elections, the LDP scored an unexpectedly large victory, reversing the downward trend in the popular vote and capturing 57 percent of the Diet seats. Almost imme-

diately, a leadership struggle commenced among Nakasone, Komoto, and Miyazawa. When no consensus on any of these three LDP leaders emerged, the Ohira faction nominated Zenko Suzuki as a compromise candidate. Supported by former Prime Minister Tanaka, Suzuki finally received the backing of all of the factions after negotiations on Cabinet positions had been settled.

Factional politics in Japan play a more important role than Diet politics, because the major policy decisions are made within the Liberal Democratic Party. Once consensus is reached within the party, voting is strictly on party lines. The Diet becomes merely the showcase where decisions, already made in another forum, are publicly displayed. Accordingly, successful implementation of burden-sharing initiatives will require the support of the major LDP factions.

Limited Power of the Prime Minister

Closely related to the issue of party factionalism is the diffusion of power within the Japanese political structure, the strength of the bureaucracy, and the limited power of the Prime Minister to implement policy independently. Unlike the President of the United States who chooses his Cabinet from a broad spectrum of both public officials and private individuals, the Prime Minister chooses his Cabinet from among the factional powers in the LDP in order to assure their continued support. The Prime Minister has considerable power in relation to his Cabinet ministers because he can both appoint them to office and remove them from office. This power is in fact frequently exercised in the form of Cabinet reshuffles. Although individual Cabinet ministers do not have a great deal of autonomous power as heads of their respective ministries, the career bureaucracies, particularly the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), wield significant independent power. An exception is the Japan Defense Agency, which as one observer has noted has little influence outside the sphere of technical military opera-

tions: "It is not an accident that the Japanese defense forces are carefully compressed within a bureaucratic agency rather than a ministry of defense."²⁹ The Finance Ministry, the most powerful of the Japanese ministries, usually has the last word on Defense Agency budget submissions and policy proposals.

As a result of this diffuse power structure, a policy or course of action established by the Prime Minister that does not have the support of the career bureaucracy has little chance of implementation. For example, after the summit between President Carter and Prime Minister Ohira in Washington in May 1980, Ohira pledged to achieve a defense program that would increase defense spending to 1 percent of GNP. Upon his return to Japan, he proposed a 9.7 percent increase in defense spending for 1981. The Finance Ministry in effect vetoed this sizeable increase, limiting the increase in defense expenditures to 7.6 percent, a figure that US officials labeled "disappointing."

Thus, it should come as no surprise that, as a result of the constitutional, policy, and political constraints just described, Japan has had difficulty developing a defense capability based on a well-thought-out strategy. Developments within the Self-Defense Forces have been based on what was possible within these constraints, as opposed to what was necessary to provide an effective defense capability. Within this framework, Japan has remained content to have the United States provide the bulk of her defense. Although the United States cannot expect rapid or wholesale abandonment of these constraining elements, Japan must show some flexibility if it is to accept greater responsibility for its own defense and is to assume a greater share of the defense burden.

3. JAPAN'S DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION AND SOME INITIATIVES FOR INCREASED BURDEN SHARING

The most promising way to get our allies to do their share is ... by ... devising sensible initiatives for sharing—not picking up our marbles and going home if the allies won't play.

Robert W. Komer¹

It is axiomatic that burden sharing is the sine que non of collective security. Why do nations form alliances in the first place if not, as Komer has suggested, to provide for a credible defense at a politically acceptable cost? The problem, however, according to Komer, is that

Neither we nor our allies have ever carried ... mutual interdependence to its logical burden-sharing conclusion. We join alliances, make commitments, even create combined commands, and often hold combined exercises. But each ally still "thinks nationally" and designs its military posture as if it were going to fight the next war alone.²

General David C. Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has called this behavior the "sin of unilateralism," and it is as applicable to Japan as to our other allies. Many influential Japanese still advocate "autonomous defense"; and former Prime Minister Suzuki has stated that "we should be prepared to defend ourselves by ourselves."

Despite the bombast over unilateralism and autonomous defense, the more realistic view is that the US-Japan alliance

will continue for the indefinite future. The issue, then, is how can Japan more effectively assume a greater share of the mutual defense burden? Is Japan's military capability adequate to counter the perceived threats? Exactly what defense responsibilities does the United States want Japan to assume? The United States has been criticized for failing to specify what we want Japan to do and for failing to help Japan to define its own defense role. One political commentator has noted that US demands for a substantial increase in Japanese defense spending "stem almost exclusively from US budget pressures ... without any real thought of what Japan would defend itself against, how the money would be spent, or where."³

The validity of the criticism is at least partially open to question. True, the issue of defense burden sharing is linked to US domestic economic problems, but the United States has proposed some concrete burden-sharing measures. Still, the United States needs to define more clearly those areas in which Japan could make a greater contribution. All proposed initiatives must be realistically evaluated against the constitutional and other constraints previously discussed; illegal or politically unacceptable proposals are essentially counterproductive.

JAPAN'S DEFENSE BUDGET

The logical starting point for analysis of the Japanese defense contribution is the defense budget. Table 3.1 shows Japan's defense budgets for the years 1977 through 1982, the annual percentage increase for the same period, and the ratio of defense spending to the total budget.

Several trends are particularly noteworthy. First, as table 3.1 shows, the percentage increase in the defense budget over the previous year declined from a high of 12.4 percent in FY 1978 to the 7.75 percent increase in FY 1982. In addition, the ratio of defense budget to total budget declined from 5.9 percent in 1977 to 5.2 percent in 1982.

Table 3.1
Japan's Defense Budget FY 1977-1982

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Defense Budget (In billions of Yen)	1,680.6	1,901.0	2,094.5	2,230.2	2,400.0	2,586.1
Increase over Pre- vious Year (%)	11.8	12.4	10.2	6.5	7.6	7.75
Percentage of To- tal Budget	5.9	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.1	5.2

Table 3.2 lists the major categories of defense expenditures together with the percentage of the total defense budget represented by each category. This table reveals that the major portion of Japan's defense budget is allocated to personnel expenses. The slight downward trend from a high of 55 percent in 1977 to 47.7 percent in 1981 is due to lower wage increases in the government sector for that period. Still, Japanese personnel costs are approximately double those of Warsaw Pact nations. One encouraging trend is the increase in expenditures for equipment, from 17.4 percent in 1977 to 22.5 percent in 1981. In contrast, research and development expenditures are a mere 1 percent of total defense spending.

Although most of the expenditure categories are self-explanatory, the base countermeasures category, which now exceeds 10 percent of the defense budget, deserves a note. This category encompasses a number of measures to improve the environment of Japanese citizens living in the vicinity of US Forces Japan (USFJ) and Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) bases: noise abatement, housing relocation, landscaping, nuisance prevention, road improvement, improvement of public welfare facilities, grants to local municipalities, and compensation for damages. It also includes expenditures for the improvement and relocation of USFJ facilities, rental of facilities, fishery and other compensations, and welfare and other benefits for past and present Japanese employees of US forces. This portion of the budget contains the major

Table 3.2
Percentage Breakdown of Japanese
Defense Expenditures by Category, FY 1977-1981

Category	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Personnel and Provisions	55.0	54.4	51.4	49.3	47.7
Equipment Acquisition ^a	17.4	17.1	18.7	20.7	22.5
Maintenance Expenses ^b	14.5	14.5	13.9	14.1	14.7
Base Countermeasures	8.0	8.7	10.2	10.4	10.5
Facility Improvement	2.4	2.4	2.9	2.8	2.2
Research and Development	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0
Other	1.5	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.5

Source: Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1981*.

Notes: a. Equipment acquisition expenditures include those for weapons, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels.

b. Maintenance expenditures include those for housing, clothing, and training.

portion of the Japanese contribution to the support of US forces in Japan.

Support of US Forces

One way Japan could make a greater contribution to sharing the defense burden is through direct support of US forces in Japan. Excluding 7th Fleet personnel forward-deployed to Japan, US military personnel in Japan total about 45,000. Table 3.3 gives a breakdown of US force structure by service and lists the major units and installations of each service. The cost of maintaining these forces is significant. In FY 1981, military salaries alone amounted to \$896 million. Table 3.4 breaks down the cost of maintaining these forces in Japan.

Table 3.3
Disposition of US Forces in Japan

Service	Force Strength	Major Units and Installations
Army	2,300	Camp Zama US Army Japan/IX Corps Hq US Army Garrison, Japan Makimino (Okinawa) US Army Garrison, Okinawa 3d Division Support Group
Navy	6,800	Yokosuka Naval Base Commander, US Naval Forces, Japan Fleet Activities Yokosuka Submarine Group Seven Destroyer Squadron 15 Ship Repair Facility Naval Supply Depot Naval Communications Station Atsugi Naval Air Facility Commander Fleet Air Western Pacific Kamiseya Patrol Wing 1 Misawa Naval Air Facility, Misawa Sasebo Naval Support Activity, Sasebo Kadena (Okinawa) Naval Air Facility, Kadena
Air Force	14,000	Yokota HQ, US Forces Japan HQ, 5th Air Force 457th Air Base Wing 316th Tactical Airlift Wing Misawa 6112th Air Base Wing Kadena (Okinawa) 313th Air Division 18th Tactical Fighter Wing 376th Strategic Air Wing
Marines	22,800	Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni 12th and 15th Marine Air Groups Okinawa Camp Butler, Camp Schwab, Camp Hansen, and Camp Courtney HQ, 3d Marine Division HQ, 3d Marine Amphibious Force HQ, 1st Marine Air Wing 36th Marine Air Wing 4th, 9th, and 12th Marine Regiments

Table 3.4
Cost of Maintaining US Forces in Japan, FY 1981

Item	Cost (in millions)
Military Salaries	\$896.0
US Civilian Personnel	64.0
Operation & Maintenance (Japanese Labor Costs)	341.2
Operation & Maintenance (All other)	392.8
Military Construction	34.0
Bulk POL	550.0
Total Costs	\$2,278.0

Four specific ways by which Japan could reduce the US burden of maintaining these forces are described in the following paragraphs.

Increased Labor Cost Sharing

Article XII of the Status of Forces Agreement provides that "local labor requirements of United States Armed Forces ... shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Japanese authorities." Under this system, US labor requirements are communicated to Japanese officials who become the nominal employer and do the actual hiring. The Japanese employees are covered by a master labor contract, which specifies salaries, conditions of employment, and other particulars. The United States then reimburses Japan for the cost of this labor. As of February 1981, 20,440 Japanese were employed by US forces at an annual cost of approximately \$340 million. In 1978-1979, Japan assumed some of the costs of this labor, including welfare benefits and portions of salaries exceeding standards set for national public service personnel. Japan's assumption of all labor costs associated with the employment of Japanese workers by US forces would be a significant burden-sharing initiative. Table 3.5 shows the increase in Japanese labor costs between 1970 and 1981.

Table 3.5
Cost to the United States of Japanese Labor

	1970	1975	1981
Average cost per employee	\$4,900	\$9,360	\$18,878
Percentage Increase over 1970 cost	—	91	285

Provision of Additional Facilities

Under article XXIV of the SOFA, Japan is responsible for providing facilities and areas for use by US forces, and in a number of places the existing facilities need to be upgraded or new ones need to be built. One of the most urgent requirements is for additional family and bachelor enlisted housing. In Yokosuka alone, approximately 1,400 units are needed.⁴ Private rentals in the local economy, often expensive, inadequate, or both, are also in short supply. Waiting lists for base housing are long, and waiting periods of eight to twelve months are not uncommon. The Navy has been urging the Japanese for several years to build additional housing at Ikego, an unused facility near Yokosuka that could serve both Yokosuka and Atsugi. Progress on this proposal has been mired in both local and national politics. Other needed facilities include new or reconstructed oil storage facilities; on-shore sewage disposal systems to accommodate shipboard waste disposal; refurbishment of older housing units, BOQs, and enlisted barracks; aircraft shelters; mine storage facilities; and improved port facilities.

Payment of Housekeeping Costs

Japan could contribute toward the support of US forces by paying for or furnishing free housekeeping items such as utilities (heating and lighting), garbage disposal, water, and sewage.

Host Nation Support

Japan could execute and implement a Host Nation Support Agreement similar to those now existing between the United States and certain NATO countries. Under such an agreement, Japan would be required to earmark or stockpile certain materials such as petroleum, oil, jet fuel, lubricants, ammunition, and other war reserve supplies for use by US forces in the event of an emergency in Japan or in other areas of the Far East, including Korea. Such an agreement could also provide for the shared use of SDF bases, and for emergency use of commercial airports and port facilities, transportation systems, and medical facilities. This type of agreement would provide the United States with avoidance costs in peacetime and significant savings in the event of crisis, at a relatively low cost to Japan.

INCREASED CAPABILITIES OF JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

The Japanese Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954 with the enactment of the Self-Defense Force Law. Three years later, in May 1957, the Cabinet adopted a Basic Policy for National Defense, which declares that "the objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression," but if Japan were invaded "to repel such aggression." The four elements of the policy are spelled out as follows:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation in other ways, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. To promote the public welfare and enhance patriotism, thereby establishing the sound foundation essential for Japan's security.
3. To develop an effective self-defense capability with appropriate regard for the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.

4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-US security arrangements, until such time as the United Nations becomes more effective in deterring and repelling aggression.⁵

This basic defense policy has remained unchanged since its adoption.

The Gradual Buildup

To develop the effective self-defense capability just mentioned as item 3 in the basic defense policy, Japan has gradually built up her Self-Defense Forces through four successive defense plans. Table 3.6 gives a breakdown of the force structure under each of these four plans. When the fourth buildup plan ended in 1976, Japan adopted a new approach toward assessing its defense needs. Instead of setting specific requirements to be realized within a set period, the government developed a National Defense Program Outline, which established the objectives and defined the responsibilities of the Self-Defense Forces. Japan now emphasizes qualitative improvements in defense capability rather than quantitative additions to force structure. Table 3.7 specifies the personnel quotas, equipment, and force structure of the Self-Defense Forces proposed under the National Defense Program Outline. To provide for the systematic implementation of the program outline, the Japan Defense Agency, in 1979, developed a concept referred to as the Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate. Covering a five-year period from 1980 through 1984, the first mid-term estimate assigned priorities to the projects specified under the National Defense Program Outline. It also served as a guide in preparing the annual defense plan and budgetary requests.

Despite its good intentions, the Defense Agency has conceded that the current mid-term estimate is behind schedule and that "even if it is attained in its entirety, the nation's defense capability will still fall short of the level envisaged by the National Defense Program Outline."⁶ The Defense Agency re-

Table 3.6
Japanese Defense Buildup Plans, 1958-1976

Item (FY)		1st Buildup Plan (1958-1960)	2nd Buildup Plan (1962-1966)	3rd Buildup Plan (1967-1971)	4th Buildup Plan (1972-1976)
Self-Defense Personnel Quota		170,000 men	171,500 men	179,000 men	180,000 men
GSDP- Basic Units	Units Deployed Regionally in Peacetime	6 Divisions 3 Composite Brigades	12 Divisions —	12 Divisions —	12 Divisions 1 Composite Brigade
	Mobile Operation Units	1 Mechanized Combined Brigade 1 Tank Regiment	1 Mechanized Division 1 Tank Regiment	1 Mechanized Division 1 Tank Regiment	1 Mechanized Division 1 Tank Brigade
		1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade	1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade	1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade	1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade
	Low-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	—	2 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions	4 Antiaircraft Artillery Groups (another group being prepared)	8 Antiaircraft artillery Groups
	Antisubmarine Surface-Ship Units (for mobile operations)	3 Escort Flotillas	3 Escort Flotillas	4 Escort Flotillas	4 Escort Flotillas
	Antisubmarine Surface-Ship Units (Regional District Units)	5 Divisions	5 Divisions	10 Divisions	10 Divisions
	Submarine Units	—	2 Divisions	4 Divisions	6 Divisions
	Minesweeping Units	1 Flotilla 9 Squadrons	2 Flotillas 15 Squadrons	2 Flotillas 14 Squadrons	2 Flotillas 16 Squadrons
	Land-Based Antisubmarine Aircraft Units				
MSDP- Basic Units					

Table 3.7
Japanese Force Structure Under National
Defense Program Outline

Self-Defense Personnel Quota			180,000 Men
GSDF	Basic Units	Units deployed regionally in peacetime	12 Divisions
		Mobile Operation Units	2 Composite Brigades 1 Armored Division 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade
	Low-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units		8 Antiaircraft Artillery
MSDF	Basic Units	Antisubmarine Surface-Ship Units (for mobile operations)	4 Escort Flotillas
		Antisubmarine Surface-Ship Units (Regional District Units)	10 Divisions
		Submarine Units	6 Divisions
		Minesweeping Units	2 Flotillas
		Land-based Antisubmarine Aircraft Units	16 Squadrons
	Major Equipment	Antisubmarine Surface Ships	Apx. 80 Ships
		Submarines	16 Submarines
	Combat Aircraft		Apx. 220 Aircraft
ASDF	Basic Units	Aircraft Control and Warning Units	28 Groups
		Interceptor Units	10 Squadrons
		Support Fighter Units	3 Squadrons
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 Squadrons
		Air Transport Units	3 Squadrons
		Early Warning Units	1 Squadron
		High-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	6 Groups
	Major Equipment	Combat Aircraft	Apx. 430 Aircraft

Source: Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1981*.

Note: This list is based on the equipment structure that the SDF possesses, or was scheduled to possess, at the time the National Defense Program Outline was drafted.

cently formulated a second Mid-Term Program Estimate covering the 1983-1987 period. The objective of this program estimate is to attain, at a minimum, the goals set in the National Defense Program Outline.

The Roles and Missions Approach

In contrast to President Carter's policy of urging increased Japanese spending on defense, the Reagan Administration's approach to defense burden sharing with Japan has emphasized "roles and missions." Instead of urging that a certain percentage of GNP be devoted to defense, the United States is advocating that Japan develop a force structure capable of effectively accomplishing certain roles and missions. In a television interview in Tokyo in December 1981, Secretary of Defense Weinberger stated that he was "very comfortable" with the role for Japan outlined by then Prime Minister Suzuki during his May 1980 meeting with President Reagan, to provide for the self-defense of the Japanese islands and defense of the air space and the sealanes, up to a thousand miles from the shoreline. For its part, the United States would continue to provide the nuclear umbrella, offensive projection forces in the Northwest Pacific, and sealane protection forces in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans. When Weinberger was asked whether this role would require substantial increases in Japan's defense expenditures, additional equipment, and more sophisticated weapons systems for Japan, he replied that that was a matter for the Japanese Government to decide, but indicated that the United States would be glad to advise Japan on such matters, adding that,

We are more than willing ... to enter into joint military discussions as to what is the most effective way to carry out that portion of the Japanese defense of its homeland and of its air space and sea space.

According to news sources, advice on this subject had in fact already been communicated to the Japanese at a security conference held in Hawaii in June 1981.⁷ At this conference, the United States provided an estimate of the force structure that Japan would require in order for Japan to effectively defend its air space and the sealanes out to one thousand miles. Table 3.8 compares this estimated force structure with both the existing force structure and that called for under the Mid-Term Program Estimate.

Table 3.8 shows that for Japan to carry out the missions defined by Suzuki, Japan must significantly increase its naval and air forces. And, even if the Japanese accept US estimates on this force structure, the lead time required for procurement means that these forces would not be in place until the late 1980s or early 1990s. Accordingly, under either approach, it will be a number of years before the force structure outlined by the National Defense Program or the structure estimated by the United States to accomplish the roles and missions accepted by Japan will become a reality. In the meantime, aside from these increases in air and naval strength, Japan could

Table 3.8
Japanese Force Structure Comparison

Item	Existing Force Structure	Mid-Term Program Estimate	US Proposals
Destroyer-type Vessels	50	60	70
ASW Reconnaissance. Air- craft P-3C/P-2J	82 P-2J 5 P-3C	100	125
Interceptor Aircraft F-15/F-4	10 Squadrons	10 Squadrons	14 Squadrons
Submarines	13	16	25

strengthen its Self-Defense Forces in other ways that would have a positive effect on burden sharing. These proposals are discussed in the next section.

INITIATIVES FOR STRENGTHENING THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

This section assumes that the US-Japan security treaty will continue to be the cornerstone of Japan's defense, and that Japan will not, within the foreseeable future, either opt for an autonomous defense or develop a nuclear capability. The initiatives discussed here pertain to qualitative or quantitative improvements to Japan's existing conventional capability. The ultimate objective should be to develop a credible, threat-oriented, defense force that complements US force structure and is interoperable with US forces.

Restructuring the Self-Defense Forces

Japan should thoroughly review its existing force structure to determine whether it is properly configured to effectively counter the probable threats. At present, the manning quota of the Ground Self-Defense Force is more than twice that of the combined Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces. Although an amphibious assault and tank warfare on the northern island of Hokkaido cannot be completely ruled out, the more likely battle scenario for Japan concerns the interdiction of the sea lines of communication and a fight for the control of the air and sea space surrounding Japan. Accordingly, the Self-Defense Forces should be restructured to reflect the expanded roles and missions for the maritime and air forces both in terms of manpower and equipment. Emphasis should be placed on antisubmarine warfare (ASW), minelaying and minesweeping capability, and air defense. New manpower quotas should be established or the old quotas reallocated to reflect this emphasis. At a minimum, the Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces, now manned below quota, should be brought up to full strength.

Increasing Readiness, Sustainability, and Force Interoperability

In addition to restructuring its Self-Defense Forces, Japan needs to increase the readiness, sustainability, and interoperability of its forces. American and Japanese analysts have maintained that the Self-Defense Forces are not combat ready. In a statement to the US House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs on 1 March 1982, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Francis West noted:

[Japan's] Self-Defense Forces cannot sustain its army divisions, destroyers, and tactical aircraft in combat due to very limited supplies of ammunition, torpedoes, and missiles. The size and modernization of Japan's air and naval forces are not adequate to defend its air space and sea lanes to 1,000 miles against the Soviet force levels of the 1980's.... Owing to these shortcomings, the Self-Defense Forces do not constitute effective deterrence.

A study prepared by the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies states:

Readiness is at a dangerously low level. Peacetime reserves of personnel and equipment are insufficient.... No mobilization system has yet been established. Furthermore, due to an insufficiency of mines and other explosives and virtual lack of fortifications in strategic locations, it is conceivable that a major portion of Japan could be devastated during the early stages of a war.⁸

Deficiencies in readiness extend to the command and control systems, intelligence apparatus, air defense and ASW systems, and training capacity.

With regard to command and control of the Self-Defense Forces, there is now no central command authority, but plans

to establish a central command system were formulated in 1978 and construction commenced in FY 1981. The purpose of this system is to coordinate the operations of the three services, integrating the MSDF's Fleet Command Support System and the ASDF's Base Air Defense Ground Environment System (BADGE). The central command system will be operational in 1983 at the earliest.

Japan's air defense system will be enhanced in the future by the acquisition of more F-15 fighters, which are now being produced in Japan under license. The acquisition of the E-2C early-warning aircraft and the modernization of the BADGE system will significantly enhance early-warning capability.

As an example of the state of readiness of the Self-Defense Forces, only in August 1980 did Air SDF interceptors begin to carry air-to-air missiles and Maritime SDF escort vessels to carry torpedoes as part of their main armament.

All Self-Defense Forces suffer from a lack of adequate training facilities, but this is particularly true of the Air SDF in air-to-air combat training and the firing of air-to-surface missiles. Many of the flight training areas are over water far from the air bases, so actual training time is very limited. In addition, noise abatement regulations limit night-time air training. The Ground SDF and Maritime SDF also have training problems. A US-Japan ASW exercise in May 1981 was severely constrained and shortened because it interfered with Japanese fishermen. To overcome these training deficiencies, Japan must acquire additional air, sea, and ground training areas for conducting realistic training exercises.

In addition to increasing the readiness of its forces, Japan needs to improve their sustainability in the event of conflict. Present sustainability in terms of some materials is estimated from several hours to a few days. Essential supplies such as ammunition, weapons, fuel and other POL products, and other war reserve materials are in short supply. The small reserve forces are poorly equipped and receive minimal training. The Ground SDF reserve consists of 39,000 men recruited mainly from SDF retirees, and Maritime SDF and Air SDF reserves

are practically nonexistent. To increase sustainability, mobilization plans must be formulated, and adequate supplies of essential materials must be stockpiled. A viable reserve force should be established and realistic training provided for this force.

Closely related to the concepts of readiness and sustainability is force interoperability—that is, the ability of US and Japanese forces to plan and conduct joint operations for the common defense of Japan. Despite the long-term security arrangement between the United States and Japan, very little consideration had been given to joint operations or joint planning prior to 1978. The basis for greater defense cooperation between the two countries was established in the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, which called for joint planning and cooperation in areas such as command and control, intelligence exchange, and logistics support. Since the adoption of these guidelines, Japan has participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) joint naval exercises that included forces from the United States, New Zealand, and Australia. In addition, several joint air exercises, ASW training, and communications drills have been held. Still, joint planning and operations are in their infancy; much more needs to be done in this area if significant results are to be achieved. The first plan for the joint defense of Japan was completed in 1981, 30 years after the implementation of the first US-Japan security treaty.

4. US STRATEGY TO INFLUENCE JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION

The issue to be resolved is this: What measures can Japan take to provide more effectively for its own defense and to assume a greater share of the US-Japan defense burden? A related question is, How should the United States approach Japan on this issue? As noted in chapter 1, the US-Japan alliance has changed significantly in the three decades since the first security treaty was signed in 1951. Initially, the United States acted as a sovereign protectorate over a vanquished, demilitarized enemy. Japan became a democracy as a result of its "American" constitution, the land and business (zaibatsu) reform, and the return of sovereignty to the people. In the years following the occupation, Japan rebuilt and continuously expanded her industrial base, emerging in the 1980s with the world's second-largest economy.

In recent years, Japan has begun to move more aggressively on the international front, taking political initiatives commensurate with her new position as a global economic power. Japan's leaders appear to recognize that Japan can no longer remain a spectator in the international arena, but must actively participate in shaping world events. In effect, Japan has come of age in the international community and is attempting to define her role on the world stage. Japan's broadened political horizons have, of course, added new dimensions to our bilateral relationship.

JAPAN AS AN EQUAL PARTNER

The dramatic changes in Japan demand new approaches to the US-Japan security relationship. It made sense for the

United States to provide for Japan's defense during the years of reconstruction following the war, but the rationale for continuing this practice no longer exists. Japan must take greater responsibility for its own defense and shoulder a greater share of the cost of maintaining the alliance. Relations between the two countries can no longer be conducted on a senior-partner/junior-partner basis. Both sides should abandon any residual "occupation mentality"; the US-Japan alliance must be based on mutual respect and equality. The United States no longer has the right to demand specific performance from Japan, just as Japan is no longer required to accede to US demands. In practice, however, both countries have had some difficulty adjusting to the changes and the new roles that each must assume in the expanded relationship. This is particularly true of the trade relationship, for economic friction has affected the political and military aspects of the alliance.

How, then, should we approach this more mature partnership with Japan? Should we treat Japan any differently from the way we treat our other major allies? A Brookings Institution study suggests:

The first lesson for American officials dealing with Japan is that she should be thought of like any large allied country. In analyzing a particular US-Japan political problem and deciding how to handle it, Americans should ask the same sorts of questions and employ the same sorts of negotiating tactics, as they would when dealing with Britain, Canada, Italy, or France.¹

The point of this advice is that, despite political and cultural differences, Japan is a modern, Western-oriented country whose internal decisionmaking process, while possessing unique characteristics, does not differ greatly from our own.

This advice is particularly applicable to the burden-sharing issue. Japan considers the US-Japan relationship to be somewhat akin to the NATO alliance; Japan therefore closely monitors US requests to NATO and the contribution

that NATO countries make to that alliance. Japanese literature on defense matters frequently compares Japan's defense efforts with those of NATO countries. For example, a Japanese Embassy briefing memorandum on the Japanese FY 1982 defense budget states that the real increases in Japan's FY 1981 and FY 1982 defense spending were 3.9 percent and 4.62 percent respectively, "well above the 3 percent real increase committed by the NATO countries." The memorandum did not mention that the NATO nations have fallen short of this 3 percent goal, but neither did it mention that most NATO countries, unlike Japan, are already spending 3 to 4 percent of GNP on defense.

This comparison with NATO, from the Japanese perspective, is a realistic benchmark of how much defense spending is enough. Japan points out that, in absolute terms, its defense budget is greater than the defense budgets of every NATO country except West Germany, Britain, and France, and that its rate of increase in defense spending over the past few years has exceeded that of every country in the NATO alliance. The Japanese view is that the United States should expect no more from Japan than it demands of its NATO allies. Japan also points out that it has often been a more reliable ally than some of the NATO countries, since it supported US sanctions in both the Iranian hostage situation and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, Japan joined the Olympic boycott and maintained economic sanctions against the Soviets to its economic detriment, while less principled Western allies rushed in to accept Soviet contracts that would otherwise have gone to Japan.

In dealing with Japan, then, US leaders should, to the extent possible, treat Japan much the same way we treat our other major allies, on the basis of equality. The United States should exercise a degree of sensitivity in areas where known political or legal constraints exist; in the area of defense, for example, issues that conflict with constitutional prohibitions or long-standing policy constraints should be approached with extreme caution. United States decisionmakers must carefully gauge Japanese attitudes and receptivity to security meas-

ures; miscalculations are sure to produce both resistance and friction.

Quiet Diplomacy vs. Public Demands

The Carter and Reagan administrations have taken different approaches to the burden-sharing issue. Under the Carter administration, the United States publicly demanded increased defense spending, and then publicly chastised Japan when her defense efforts fell short of Washington's expectations. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown openly applied the "free ride" label to Japan, and State Department officials openly described Japan's defense efforts as "disappointing." Inevitably, the Japanese press picked up these public criticisms, and the effect on Japanese public opinion was negative.

A potentially more productive approach is the Reagan administration's attempt to influence Japan's defense efforts through quiet but firm diplomacy. This diplomatic effort must emphasize Japan's self-interest in an improved defense. The experience of the past three decades has amply demonstrated that the Japanese do not respond to threats and demands. Any substantial increase in Japan's defense efforts will come about only as a result of Japan's own assessment of the international political and security environment. This assessment must ultimately be acceptable to the Japanese people and therefore based on realistic Japanese needs and requirements.

This is not to say that the United States should have no input on the issue of Japan's security. On the contrary, the United States can greatly assist Japan in defining the threats to its security and in developing the proper force structure to meet these threats. The United States should exert influence at every level of government, from the White House down, to establish a rational division of labor and to define roles and missions for our respective forces. The initiatives suggested in chapter 3 provide a starting point for a continuing dialogue.

Such a dialogue will not be successful, however, until the Japanese leadership and public are convinced that a security threat exists and that defense efforts must be increased to counter that threat. Until the Japanese are persuaded to this view, we can expect no great departure from the current gradual pace of increased defense efforts.

Prior Consultation on Issues Affecting the Alliance

In adjusting to our new relationship with Japan, it is essential that the United States place more emphasis on consultation between governments on issues affecting mutual interests. The history of the alliance is strewn with surprises, or "shocks," as the Japanese refer to them, which have added unnecessary friction to the relationship. The best examples are the so-called Nixon shocks of 1971, involving the now-celebrated visit to China, and the fiscal adjustments to the US economy consisting of tax cuts, wage and price controls, import surcharges, and dollar devaluation. All these initiatives deeply affected Japan, but the United States did not consult with Japan prior to their implementation. A more recent example is the Reagan administration's lifting of the Soviet grain embargo without consultation with Japan. The Japanese, who had been supporting US policy with economic sanctions of their own, were left questioning US resolve—not to mention their being embarrassed by the United States lack of coordination with them on this policy decision.

There will, of course, be issues on which US and Japanese interests will differ and on which agreement cannot be reached. The issue is not necessarily agreement, but rather the opportunity of each partner to either adjust policies or make contingency plans to protect its own interests.

Threat Assessment and Japan's Security

Finally, the United States should encourage Japan to evaluate realistically the threats to its security and to develop

a force structure to meet these threats. The roles and missions of these forces should complement those of US forces. The time is long overdue for Japan to examine its security needs, formulate a strategy to meet them, and assume more responsibility for its own defense. Japan's present course of allowing the United States to provide the lion's share of its conventional defense in addition to sealane protection and the nuclear umbrella is no longer acceptable in the view of the United States. If Japan is to play an effective defense role, it must develop, at a minimum, the forces required to fulfill former Prime Minister Suzuki's stated policy of defending the sea and air space around Japan and the sealanes out to 1,000 miles.

Recently, the Japanese have stressed a concept of "comprehensive security," calling for the employment of nonmilitary instruments of foreign policy, such as diplomacy and development assistance to promote regional stability. This concept is not new and the United States should not endorse it as a substitute for either increased burden sharing or improved defense capability. Civilized nations have always practiced diplomacy, and development assistance and economic aid are merely added responsibilities of democratic societies.

In an interview published in *Newsweek* on 16 November 1981, US Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield stated that the Japanese "should, can, and will do more" on defense. The unanswered questions, however, are, When? and How much?

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. US, Department of Defense, *United States Military Posture for FY 1982* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 16.
2. Leonard Sullivan, Jr., "The Real Long-Range Defense Dilemma: Burden Sharing," *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1981, p. 56.
3. Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 59.
4. The delay between recognition and conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was due to Japan's reluctance to accept an antihegemony clause on which the Chinese insisted. Japan feared that such a clause would bring reprisals from the USSR. See William R. Heaton, Jr., *A United Front Against Hegemonism: Chinese Foreign Policy into the 1980s*, National Security Affairs Monograph Series 80-3 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 29-30.
5. Tracy Dahlby, "Japan Uneasily Welcomes Arafat on Visit Set Before Sadat's Death," *Washington Post*, 13 October 1981, p. A-17. According to this article, Japan was prepared to offer Egypt \$150 million in outright grants for 1982.
6. Japanese Center for Strategic Studies, *The Defense of Japan: An Alternative View from Tokyo*, translated and edited by The Heritage Foundation, International Briefing No. 9, 7 August 1981, Washington, DC, p. 2.
7. Ibid.
8. The complete text of the Reagan-Suzuki Joint Communiqué is reproduced in *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 81, no. 2051, June 1981, pp. 2-4.
9. Japanese Center for Strategic Studies, *The Defense of Japan*, p. 2.

10. These three events were the sinking on 9 April 1981 of the Japanese merchant vessel *Nissho Maru* in a collision with the USS *George Washington*, a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; the publishing on 18 May 1981 in the *Mainichi Shimbun* of allegations made by former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer that US warships carrying nuclear weapons routinely transited Japanese territorial waters and entered Japanese ports; and the alleged involvement of US Navy vessels in the destruction of Japanese long-line fishing gear during a joint US-Japan antisubmarine warfare exercise in the Sea of Japan on 14-17 May 1981.

11. US, Department of Defense, *Report on Allied Commitments to Defense Spending* (Washington, DC: March 1981), p. 4.

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